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Leasing, Inc., 416 U.S. 663 (1974). The 
court then ordered the forfeiture of the 
Beechcraft to the United States. 
Both Total Time and Sundance appealed 
the forfeirure by protesting that they were 
improperly denied a jury trial, that air-
planes do not constitute forfeirure propeny 
and that there was insufficient evidence to 
allow the forfeiture. 
The court of appeals concluded that To-
tal Time and Sundance, despite making 
timely requests for a trial by jury in their 
answers to the complaint, waived this right 
by failing to object to the district court's 
decision to try the case without a jury. Both 
defendants "vigorously participated" in the 
trial without mentioning their earlier re-
quest for a jury uial. Id. at 951. The court 
relied on its ruling in Milner tI. Norfolk & 
WeslernRailwayCo., 643F.2d 1005(1981), 
which, according to the court, stood for the 
proposition that basic equitable principles 
did not "mandate a jury trial if the plaintiff 
was on notice that the uial court was plan-
ning to adjudicate the dispositive issues of 
fact in the case and did not object." U.s. tI. 
1966 Beechcrafc, 777 F.2d at 951, citing 
Miller, 643 F.2d at 10 11, n.l. Since Total 
Time and Sundance were aware of the 
court's plan, to allow the defendants to re-
quest a jury and then "ambush the trial 
judge" on appeal would be unfair. 777 F.2d 
at 951, citing Palmer v. United States, 652 
F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981). 
Total Time next asserted that as an "in-
nocent owner" it was exempt from the 
"broad sweep" of the forfeiture statutes. 
In Calero, the Supreme Court determined 
that an owner would not be subject to the 
forfeirure statutes wbere it was shown the 
owner was "not only uninvolved in and 
unaware of any wrongful activity, but that 
he had done all that could reasonably be 
expected to prevent the proscribed use of 
his property." 777 F.2d at 951. Seeright's 
behavior in the ca e at bar was determined 
to be unbusinesslike as well as unwise, par-
ticularly in an area "such as outh Florida 
where drug trafficking through the use of 
private aircraft flouri hes." The "conscious 
indifference" on the part of eeright estab-
lished that Total Time failed to do "all that 
it reasonably could to avoid having it prop-
erty put to unlawful u e." 777 F.2d at 952. 
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit concluded 
that the district court did not err in deter-
mining that Total Time wa not an inno-
cent owner. 
The £inal argument on appeal involved 
the sufficiency of evidence produced at the 
uial by the government to support the for-
feiture order. Based on the te timony of 
Montgomery that the Beecbcraft carried co-
conspirators Gerant and Coddington, as 
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well as the cocaine, the court upheld the for-
feiture of the Beechcraft. The Government 
argued that the Aerostar, while not involved 
in carrying cocaine, facilitated the drug 
conspiracy by transporting two of the con-
spirator to the site of the deal and, there-
fore, it was forfeitable under the tatute. 
The circuits are divided over whether 
21 U.S.C. S881(aX4}, which subjects to 
forfeiture "all conveyances, including air-
craft, vehicles, or ves els to transport, or in 
any manner to facilitate the transportation, 
sale, receipt, possession or concealment" of 
controlled substances, may reach aircraft 
only carrying the con pirators to the trans-
action site. The First, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits have held that §881(aX4) Jays 
down a per se forfeiture of certain items of 
contraband but not of vehicle used in the 
mere transportation of suspected conspir-
ators. However, the Second, Fifth and 
Eleventh Circuits have resolved that for-
feiture is proper when a vehicle only trans-
ports the drug dealer to the exchange site. 
In aligning it elf with the laner view-
point, the court looked (0 the legislative 
history of the statute, which directed that 
the intent of the provision was to allow for-
feiture of property "only if there is a sub-
stantial connection between the property 
and the underlying criminal activity." 777 
F.2d at 952. The Fourth Circuit concluded 
that transporting conspirators to an ex-
change site establishes a C sub (anrial con-
nection between the conveyance and the 
criminal activity sufficient to justify an or-
der of forfeiture." 777 F.2d at 953. It was 
further noted that the private airplane has 
become an important tool to drug traffick-
ers, particularly by allowing for quick ar-
rivals and departures, and makes their ap-
prehension all the more difficult. 
The court's decision regarding the waiver 
of a jury trial shows a total di regard for 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 
38(d) states that after a proper request for a 
trial by jury has been made, all the parties 
involved must con ent before it can be with-
drawn. Furthermore, Rule 39(aXl) stipu-
lates that a withdrawal must be in writing or 
by verbal consent in open court and entered 
in the record. Some court hold that these 
rules are to be held in strict compliance and 
any waiver cannot occur unless within the 
precise terms of the rules. Palmer, 652 F.2d 
at 896. While some court hold that the e 
rule are not to be tTictIy construed, see 
e.g., Bass 'V. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205, 209 
(5th Cir. 1949) cere. denied, 388 U.S. 816 
(1949), these courts, including the Fourth 
Circuit, seem to be ignoring the spirit of 
the rules. A right to a jury trial "occupies 
so firm a place in our history and jurispru-
dence that any seeming curtailment of the 
right to jury trial should be scrutinized 
with (he utmost care." Dimick v. Schiedt, 
293 U.S. 474, 485 (1934). 
How far the Fourth Circuit is willing to 
go to enforce 28 U.S.C. §881 remains to 
be seen. For now, owners of private vehi-
cles need to establish step [0 ensure their 
property is not being used for illegal pur-
poses or else risk being subject to forfeiture. 
A lack of knowledge of the criminal activ-
ity is not sufficient under this recent de-
cision. In addition, allowing ones property 
to be used only by the conspirators of 
crimes clearly jeopardizes that property. 
- Patricia A. Grace 
Trimper 'V. Porter-Hayden: 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
IN ASBESTO -RELATED 
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS 
In an attempt to deal with the unique 
character of asbesto -related deaths and its 
effect on wrongful death and urvival ac-
tions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Trimper tI. PortfJr-Haydm, 305 Md. 31, 
501 A.2d 446 (1985), held that wrongful 
death actions for a be tos-related deaths 
accrue either upon the discovery of me link 
between death and exposure to asbestos or 
upon the date of death whichever occurs 
first. 
In Trimper two widows, Charlotte M. 
Trimper and Sylvia Sandberg, rued sepa-
rate actions under the survival statutes for 
the wrongful deaths of their respective 
husbands alleging that the deaths of their 
husbands resulted from their exposure to 
asbesto and a best os dust. Both women 
ftled their claim within three years from 
the discovery of the connection between 
asbestos exposure and the deaths of tbeir 
husbands. The Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City dismissed both actions finding that 
the claims were time barred and each 
widow appealed to the court of special ap-
peals where the cases were consolidated. 
Writ of Certiorari was i sued by the court 
of appeals before the court of pedal ap-
peals had the opportunity to consider the 
matter. The que lion before the court was 
whether wrongful death and survival ac-
tions for asbe to -related deaths are time 
barred when instituted more than three 
years after death or whether a discovery 
rule applies. The court considered the 
wrongful death claims apart from the sur-
vival claims a they are dealt with in sepa-
rate statutes. 
MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. 
§3-904(g) (1984) deals with wrongful death 
and provides that an action for wrongful 
death shall be brought within three years 
after the death of the injured person. 
The appellants argued that where the 
decedent died not knowing that he was a 
victim of a wrong and that the wrong had 
caused his demise, the beneficiaries should 
have up to three years from the time they 
knew or should have known the cause of 
death, within which to bring an action for 
wrongful death. Just such a discovery rule 
was established in Harig v. Johns-Manville 
Products Corp., 284 Md. 70, 394 A.2d 299 
(1978), a latent disease case. 
The Trimper court distinguished the 
Harig case from Trimper, as the former 
was brought under MD. CTS. & JUD. 
PROC. CODE ANN. §5-l0l (1984) 
which is the general statute oflimitations 
and which provides that an action shall be 
filed within three years from the date of ac-
crual of the cause of action. The court in 
Harig defined "accrual" as when a plain-
tiff, "ascertains or through the exercise of 
reasonable care and diligence should have 
ascertained the nature and cause of his in-
jury." 284 Md. at 83, 394 A.2d at 306. 
The court's definition of accrual was re-
stricted to latent disease cases. 
The Trimper court contended that prec-
edent precluded the court from applying a 
discovery rule to wrongful death actions. 
The rule in Maryland is, that since 
the wrongful death statute created a 
new liability not existing at common 
law, compliance with the period of 
limitations for such actions is a condi-
tion precedent to the right to maintain 
the action. The period oflimitations is 
part of the substantive right of action. 
305 Md. at 35, citing State v. Zitomer, 275 
Md. 534, 542, 341 A.2d 789, 794 (1975), 
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1076 (1976), citing 
Smith v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 266 
Md. 52, 55-56, 291 A.2d 452, 454 (1972); 
Dunnigan v. Coburn, 171 Md. 23, 25-26, 
187 A. 881, 884 (1936); and State v. Parks, 
148 Md. 477, 479-82, 129 A. 793, 795 
(1925). 
The legislative intent behind the crea-
tion of the wrongful death statute is abso-
lutely clear and "there is no room for judi-
cial interpretation." Trimper, 305 Md. 
at 36. 
Conversely, the survival statutes do not 
create a new cause of action unknown to 
common law, but merely alter the com-
mon law under which certain actions may 
be brought on behalf of decedents. The 
statute provides that a cause of action at 
law, except slander, survives the death of 
either party. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
CODE ANN. §6-401(a) (1984). Limita-
tions on survival actions are provided by 
the general statute of limitations. 
Appellants, as personal representatives, 
relying on Poffenberger v. Risser, 290 Md. 
631, 431 A.2d 677 (1981), which estab-
lished discovery as the general test for ac-
crual, argued to the court that the survival 
claims did not accrue until each woman 
knew or should have known of the condi-
tion between her husband's exposure to as-
bestos and the resulting diseases suffered 
by the decedents. 
In response to this argument, appellees 
argued that if no cause of action accrued 
until it was discovered after the decedents' 
respective deaths, then the decedents had 
no cause of action at the time of death and 
therefore no action may be brought on be-
half of the decedents under the survival 
statutes. 
The court distinguished Poffenberger 
from the case at bar in that the former 
never dealt with an injured person who 
subsequently died either from the injury 
complained of or from other causes with-
out having instituted a right of action for 
the injury. Rather, Poffenberger focused 
upon the injured person who discovered 
the wrong inflicted upon him while living 
but after the prescribed three years had ex-
pired. 
The court also rejected appellees' argu-
ment that appellants' claims necessarily fail 
if a discovery rule is applied. An injured 
party need not know that he has suffered 
a legally recognized wrong which has re-
sulted in harm in order to have a complete 
cause of action. The court further con-
tended that the discovery rule limits the 
period of time in which an injured plaintiff 
may bring an action for the wrong commit-
ted, "but it does not change the time when 
a cause of action becomes conceptually 
complete." Trimper, 305 Md. at 42. Ac-
cordingly, the court held that the decedents 
in these cases have a cause of action which 
survive their deaths. The court then turned 
to the question of how long the causes of 
action exist. 
Upon considering a series of case law 
dealing with statutory time bars to wrong-
ful death and survival actions, from which 
no general principle regarding the same 
could be drawn, the court held that sur-
vival actions must be brought within three 
years of the discovery of a link between the 
fatal disease and the exposure to asbestos. 
The court explicitly limited the application 
of the Qiscovery rule in survival actions to 
latent disease cases which are instituted 
initially as survival actions rather than 
wrongful death actions. The court sup-
ported its decision by referring to the 
workers compensation statute dealing spe-
cifically with latent occupational diseases. 
The statute contains a provision whereby 
an action for disability or death from pul-
monary dust disease must be brought 
within three years from the date of disable-
ment or death or the date on which the em-
ployee or his dependent discovered the link 
between the disablement or death and his 
employment. MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, 
§26(a)(4) (1985). 
Thus considering the legislative intent 
of the wrongful death statute, the discovery 
rule established in Harig, and the workers 
compensation statute, the Trimper court 
concluded that in situations involving the 
latent development of disease, a cause of 
action accrues either when a person discov-
ers or reasonably should have discovered 
the nature and cause of the injury, or at 
death whichever first occurs. Judgments 
of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City 
were affirmed. 
- Patricia Dart Brooks 
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore 
v.lndianapolis Colts, Inc.: THE 
DEMISE OF THE PUBLIC USE 
DOCTRINE 
In 1982, California acknowledged a sov-
ereign's latent power to condemn a profes-
sional sports franchise through eminent do-
main. City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders, 
32 Cal. 3d 60,183 Cal. Rptr. 673, 646 P.2d 
835 (1982). Recently in Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore v. Indianapolis Colts, 
Inc., 624 F. Supp. 278 (D.Md. 1985), the 
City of Baltimore sought to test this power 
in an attempt to enjoin the Colts football 
franchise from relocating to Indianapolis. 
Prompted by ailing negotiations between 
the City and Colt's owner Robert Irsay, 
the Maryland Senate on March 27, 1984 
passed emergency legislation authorizing 
the City of Baltimore to condemn the Colt's 
NFL franchise. In response, Mr. Irsay im-
mediately began shipping all of the team's 
physical possessions to Indianapolis. Crews 
worked throughout the night of March 28, 
and by early morning the loaded May-
flower vans had left Maryland. 
On March 30, 1984, the Maryland Leg-
islature finalized Emergency Bill No. 1042, 
1984 Md. Laws Ch. 6. Emergency Ordi-
nance No. 32 was thereafter enacted by the 
city authorizing the condemnation of sport 
franchises. A condemnation petition was 
immediately filed in the Circuit Court for 
Baltimore City seeking to acquire the Colts 
by eminent domain. On April 2, 1984 the 
Colts removed the case to the federal district 
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 
The law of eminent domain authorizes a 
sovereign to take property for public use 
without the owner's consent upon making 
just compensation. Nichol's on Eminent 
Domain (3rd ed. 1980) §1.l1 pp. 1-10. 
The majority of the case law defining the 
Spring, 19861The Law Forum-27 
